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1  
Abstract 
 In this paper, I use data from the Florida Closed Claims Database to investigate 
how Florida’s 2003 non-economic damage cap legislation impacted elderly malpractice 
claimants. More specifically, I measure whether or not non-economic damage caps 
adversely impact claimants in counties with high elderly densities. To measure the effect 
of Florida’s non-economic damage caps, I look at multiple metrics that measure both 
elderly claimants’ monetary gains and their access to the justice system after the reform is 
passed. I find mildly conclusive evidence that counties with higher elderly density, and 
assumedly more elderly claimants, are more likely to settle cases before reaching a jury 
trial and are less likely to file a medical malpractice claim. Conversely, though, I find 
limited evidence supporting the idea that elderly claimants receive less monetary damage 
payments or drop cases more. Overall, then, my findings are not consistent with the view 
that non-economic damage caps significantly discriminate against elderly claimants. 
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1: Introduction 
 The state of medical malpractice liability legislation has been debated extensively 
and fluctuated between heavy and light regulation at a state level since the liability 
insurance crisis of the 1970’s and 1980’s. With liability insurance premiums rising due to 
a seemingly excessive increase in lawsuits and jury payouts to plaintiffs, Hyman et al. 
(2009) notes that many states have adopted medical malpractice damage caps to prevent 
plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits and to encourage doctors to work in a particular 
state and to not practice “defensive medicine”, as put by Kessler and McClellan (1996). 
One particular type of damage cap, known as a non-economic damage cap, attempts to 
limit the money that can be awarded at trial for non-economic injuries in medical 
malpractice cases. Non-economic damages seek to award plaintiffs for non-physical, non-
wage related damages such as pain, suffering, and emotional distress. As claimed in a 
study by Fort et al. (1986), “noneconomic losses make up the largest portion of jury 
awards.” One estimate, provided by the Congressional Budget Office in 2013 in an 
attempt to provide solutions for lowering the federal deficit, asserts that a series of 
national tort reforms which includes capping non-economic damage caps at $250 
thousand per claimant could reduce total healthcare spending by .5%,1 and in turn could 
reduce federal healthcare expenditures by as much as $57 billion between 2014 and 2023. 
The tradeoff to installing non-economic damage caps, though, is that some valid medical 
malpractice cases will not be brought to trial because malpractice claims have a lower 
potential payout, and hence lawyers will be less willing to take on the case. The balance 
between decreasing healthcare costs and incentivizing individuals to seek justice is an 
1 Other aspects of the proposed reform would cap punitive damages, limit the statute of limitations, and 
expand permissible evidence standards at trial. 
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imperative issue to examining tort reform, and in particular to examining non-economic 
damage caps. While some studies, such as one conducted by Paik et al. (2010), have 
found that non-economic damage caps generally decrease both the number of cases that 
reach a jury award and also the total payout by insurance companies in settled cases. The 
motivation for this paper is to take this generalized analysis one step further and focus on 
how different demographics are impacted by non-economic damage caps. 
 The purpose of my study is to analyze data from the Florida Closed Claims 
Database between the years 1999 and 2009 in order to assess whether or not elderly 
populations are negatively impacted by legislation imposing non-economic damage caps. 
Florida is an excellent state to examine the impact of non-economic damage caps on 
elderly patients due to both the availability of their medical malpractice database as well 
as the general belief that many elderly people move to Florida for retirement. I 
investigate this question by examining whether non-economic damage caps produce an 
effect on the probability of filing a claim, the probability of settlement, the probability of 
dropping a claim, and the total insurance payout in settled claims for county and year 
combinations with high elderly densities. I examine these three probability measures 
because they act as a proxy for elderly citizens’ access, or at the least their expected 
access, to the court system. In a more applicative sense, if elderly patients are settling 
more cases, filing fewer claims, and dropping more cases, it would suggest that elderly 
claimants’ ability to access the medical malpractice system has declined. My fourth 
measure of fairness of non-economic damage caps, the total insurance payout in settled 
claims, is crucial to analyze because it highlights whether or not elderly claimants 
actually receive less money in medical malpractice cases when non-economic damage 
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caps are in place. I choose the years 1999 to 2009 because Florida enacted non-economic 
damage caps in late 2003. 
If non-economic damages statistically impact elderly claimants, then this may be 
motivation for Florida to adjust their medical malpractice laws to treat elderly patients 
more fairly to encourage healthy practices. As noted by several scholarly papers such as 
Paik et al. (2010) and Sager et al. (1990), medical spending is disproportionally spent on 
elderly patients, so the investigation of non-economic damage caps is imperative to 
understanding the complex dynamic between physicians, elderly patients, and the 
decision to seek medical help. Furthermore, the impact of non-economic damage caps on 
elderly patients, or even across all age cohorts, is important because tort law aims to treat 
all individuals fairly. Non-economic damage caps are an especially pertinent issue for the 
elderly, though, because older individuals are less likely to receive wages so non-
economic damages likely form a larger portion of their malpractice award. As such, the 
non-economic damage caps likely hit elderly claimants proportionally harder than those 
typically specified as working age. If specific reforms such as non-economic damage 
caps are unintentionally discriminating against elderly claimants, then the medical 
liability system is doing a poor job representing and protecting more illness-prone, not-
working individuals from medical harm. Interestingly, relatively little research has been 
conducted solely examining how the elderly have been impacted by various tort reforms. 
As noted above, because elderly people, which I define as individuals over the 
age of 65, are usually retired and do not have an income stream from an employer, they 
typically rely more heavily on non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits. 
Given the reputation of Florida as a retirement state for many elderly individuals and 
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couples, the population of Florida is an extremely intriguing state to investigate because 
of its elderly density and high frequency of patients who will not be eligible for economic 
damages at trial. Considering that elderly claimants are, theoretically, limited in the 
amount of money that they can recover by filing a claim and have less incentive to enter 
the medical malpractice claim legal procedure, I have a four-part hypothesis regarding 
each of my important parameters. Firstly, I hypothesize that, due to the imposition of 
economic damage caps in 2003, claims filed in county and year combinations with higher 
elderly densities will more be more likely to settle claims out of court because basic 
settlement theory predicts that lower potential awards will result in fewer settlements. 
Second, I predict that high elderly densities, again in a particular county and year, will 
less lower the likelihood of filing medical liability claims, which indicates the elderly are 
more likely to avoid the justice system. Likewise, my third hypothesis is that claims filed 
in county and year combinations with higher elderly densities will more frequently drop 
claims because they have a limit to their potential compensation. Finally, these three 
hypotheses lead me to predict that high elderly density will result in lower damage 
payments in settled cases because the institution of non-economic damage caps has 
changed the feasible settlement amount by capping a crucial part of elderly damage 
packages. After analyzing my data, though, I find that the imposition of Florida’s 2003 
non-economic damage cap only shows a moderate negative effect on the probability of 
settlement and filing a claim. Numerically, the partial effect of elderly density in the post-
reform period lowers the probability of settlement by roughly 8.5% to 12%,2 and lowers 
2 As I will mention in my robustness testing results, this 8.5% to 12% figure only represents elderly 
densities within two elderly age cohorts, 65-75 and 75-85. Thus, elderly density for those above 85 is not 
represented in these figures. 
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the probability of filing a case by between .5% and .8%. Contrarily, the imposition of 
non-economic damage caps does not seem to have a partial effect on the size of 
indemnity payments to elderly claimants or the probability of the elderly dropping a 
claim. Considering these mixed results, I find that the evidence presented throughout this 
paper is not consistent with the theory that non-economic damage caps are systematically 
discriminating against the elderly populations’ access to, or monetary compensation in, 
the tort system. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines a brief history of Florida’s 
medical malpractice legislation in regards to non-economic damages. Section 3 discusses 
basic settlement theory and how introducing non-economic damage caps changes the 
settlement model. Section 4 outlines my data source, data limitations, and provides 
summary statistics. Section 5 displays my full model, the results of my regressions, 
several robustness tests for my results, and limitations to my regression analysis. Section 
6 consists of my concluding remarks. 
 
2: Florida’s Tort Reform and Relevant Literature 
 
2.1: Florida Tort Reform 
 Before diving into the relevant literature studying the impact of non-economic 
damage caps, it is valuable to get a firm understanding of the evolution of tort reform in 
Florida given that my analysis focuses on the effects of medical malpractice claims in 
Florida. As noted by Black et al. (2005), Amidst the medical malpractice crisis of the 
1970’s and 1980’s, many states sought to reform their medical malpractice systems to 
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limit damages that could be awarded at trial, which would act towards decreasing 
problematically high insurance carrier premiums charged to physicians and hospitals. 
Decreasing the burden on physicians and hospitals would in turn incentivize physicians to 
practice in a particular state. While many pieces of relevant tort reform legislation have 
been passed, the success of non-economic damage caps in Florida has been 
underwhelming, as noted by the relevant and recent history of Florida’s non-economic 
damage caps provided in Appendix A. 
 According to Fort et al. (1986), prior to Florida’s 1986 tort reform legislation 
there was no cap on non-economic damages. As a result of the 1986 legislation, though, 
Fort et al. (1986) explained that Florida imposed a fairly stringent punitive damage cap as 
well as a non-economic damage cap of $450 thousand per plaintiff. This reform was 
short-lived, however. As noted by Cline and Pepine (2004), in 1987 the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled the non-economic damage cap unconstitutional. Moving forward in time, 
Cline and Pepine (2004) asserted that by 2002 Florida was in a medical malpractice crisis 
as medical malpractice liability claim payouts had increased over 3000% since 1975.3 In 
an attempt to address this crisis, Cline and Pepine (2004) discuss how Florida passed a 
fairly comprehensive set of tort reforms, and one of the byproducts of this 2003 reform 
was a $500 thousand cap per claimant on non-economic damages. Under egregious 
circumstances, the non-economic damage cap could be bumped up to $1 million, though. 
The normal non-economic cap for emergency rooms was set at $150 thousand, but could 
rise to $300 thousand in devastating cases. Kaminski (2004) also explained that the 2003 
3 In addition to Florida, Cline and Pepine (2004) adds that Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia were also considered at crisis 
levels. 
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reform stated that in claims against non-physician entities, the cap for non-economic 
damages was bumped up to $750 thousand and in egregious cases $1.5 million. In 2014, 
the Florida Supreme Court again struck down the cap on non-economic damages, 
reasoning that the cap was unfair to plaintiffs.4 Thus, the period from 1987 to 2003 is a 
period where Florida had no economic damage caps, and 2004 to 2014 is a period with 
acting non-economic damage caps, which gives me the ability to compare differences in 
claimant behavior and claim payouts across these two time periods for elderly claimants. 
See Appendix A for a more concise, condensed summary of the history and success of 
Florida tort reform. 
 
2.2: Relevant Literature Review 
There is an abundance of relevant literature examining the aggregate effects of 
tort reform and non-economic damage caps in medical malpractice. For example, a 
multitude of papers have been written predominantly by the trio of Bernard Black, 
Charles Silver, and David Hyman on Texas’ non-economic damage caps passed in 2003. 
Some of the key findings of papers written about the Texas non-economic damage cap 
will be discussed more deeply below. More generally, however, very few papers focus 
explicitly on how the elderly are impacted by such reforms. Below I will discuss the 
findings of these Texas studies, as well as other pieces of relevant literature to my 
focused investigation on elderly populations. 
 The most relevant study investigating the effect of tort reform, and more 
specifically the impact of non-economic damage caps on the elderly, is Paik et al. (2010) 
4 Mary Ellen Klas, “Fla. Supreme Court rejects damage caps on medical malpractice,” Miami Herald 
(Miami, FL), March 13th, 2014. 
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and their study using data from the Texas Closed Claims Database (1988 to 2007).5 Paik 
et al. (2010) measure if paid claim rates changed for the elderly after 2003, when Texas 
adopted a cap on non-economic damages. They find that prior to the non-economic 
damage cap legislation; elderly aggregate payout had steadily increased since 1988, but 
was still considerably low compared to the percentage of total medical spending allocated 
to the elderly. Post-reform, though, they find that there is a 63% decline in elderly claim 
filings and a 33% decline in payout per claim. The results from Paik et al. (2010) led 
them to predict a 60% drop in total claims and a roughly 33% drop in payout per claim 
for the elderly population of Texas.6 Thus, Paik et al (2010) provide strong evidence that 
non-economic damage caps have a very significant effect on reducing claims and payout 
per claim. Pertaining more explicitly to the elderly, they find that non-elderly and elderly 
claimants experience similar drops in filed claims and payout per claim. In their analysis, 
when non-economic damages are imposed, the decline in payout per claim between 
elderly and non-elderly claimants is statistically insignificant. 
The noted decline in filed claims from Paik et al. (2010) is similar to the findings 
of Burstin et al. (1993), which used data from 51 New York hospitals and found that 
elderly claimants are less likely to file medical malpractice claims. Additionally, Sager et 
al. (1990) used malpractice data from Wisconsin in 1983 and 1984 to investigate the 
likelihood of potential claimants actually filing medical malpractice claims, and found 
that the elderly file malpractice claims much less frequently than the non-elderly. Burstin 
5 Paik et al. (2010) acknowledge that they only use the Texas Closed Claims Database for medical 
malpractice cases where payout is at least $25,000 in 1988 inflation-adjusted dollars, which means that 
insurers have to file a “Long Form,” which contains more expansive information about the claim. 
6 Due to the fact that the data only was available up to 2007, Paik et al. (2010) are uncertain as to whether 
Florida’s tort reform is fully integrated into their models. Thus, they use their data to predict the real impact 
of the cap. 
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(1993) theorizes the elderly may file fewer medical malpractice cases because they 
typically have longer and more established relationship with their physicians, and also 
because they have lower expectations of doctors as they have a shorter life expectancy 
than younger patients. 
 Preceding Paik et al. (2010), Hyman et al. (2009) and Silver et al. (2008) also 
investigate the general effect of Texas’s non-economic damage cap on medical 
malpractice claims and payouts using the Texas Closed Claims Database. In contrast, 
Finley (2004) more broadly studied non-economic damage caps in California, Florida, 
and Maryland by examining how damage caps impacted gender, race, and age 
demographics. Interestingly, Hyman et al. (2009) identify that the non-economic damage 
cap altered 47% of jury awards and 18% of settled cases. In jury cases, the mean feasible 
verdict declines 37%, and in settled cases payout declines 18%.7 With regards to elderly 
plaintiffs, Hyman et al. (2009) indicate that elderly plaintiffs see a 51% drop in feasible 
verdicts, a 38% drop in aggregate payout, and a 19% decline in payout per case. Silver et 
al. (2008), likewise, finds the same decline for elderly populations. Consistent with the 
other studies that used the Texas Closed Claims Database, the difference in the decrease 
in payouts for the elderly is not significant when compared to other age demographics.8 
Unlike the Texas Closed Claims Database studies, however, Finley (2004) finds that non-
economic damage caps hit both women and the elderly, and in particular elderly women, 
7 Hyman et al acknowledge that a feasible verdict, or an “allowed verdict”, totals the allowable portion of 
jury awards plus interest. 
8 These payout decreases are calculated using data from 1988 to 2004, with the same inflation-adjusted 
method used by Paik et al. (2010). 
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hardest.9 Furthermore, Finley (2004) puts forth the belief mentioned earlier that lower 
possible payments makes lawyers less likely to accept medical malpractice cases for the 
elderly and for women. Thus, aside from the significance of their findings, Hyman et al. 
(2009), Silver et al. (2008), and Finley (2004) have similar results to those dictated in 
Paik et al. (2010). Most notably, these critical pieces of literature identify that non-
economic damages lower payouts in settled and trial cases for elderly claimants, and they 
also indicate that non-economic damage caps deter elderly people from filing medical 
malpractice claims and entering the legal system. 
 Finally, Kessler and McClellan (1996) and Shepherd and Rubin (2008) take more 
unconventional, and applicative, means to studying non-economic damages. Kessler and 
McClellan (1996) study elderly Medicare patients to measure whether or not doctors tend 
to practice defensive medicine in the face of large potential malpractice payouts. 
Specifically using data from 1984 to 1990 and looking just at one particular treatment for 
heart attacks,10 they conclude that medical spending could drop between 5% and 9% once 
damage caps are fully implemented. More important to my topic at hand, though, this 
indicates that capping non-economic damages is likely beneficial in increasing physician 
efficiency but may detract from elderly patients’ ability to recover damages for medical 
liability cases. In addition to damage recovery, though, elderly patients may be less likely 
to even seek medical attention if non-economic damages inhibit their ability to receive 
just compensation. Shepherd and Rubin (2008), likewise, examined state-level death rates 
9 Although Finley (2004) acknowledges that elderly men actually had a lower post-reform recovery in 
sample of California malpractice cases, the proportional effect was worse for women. 
10 This treatment is formally called “acute myocardial infarction”.  
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for differing demographics,11 and discovered that non-economic damage caps tend to 
decrease non-accidental deaths in a given state, but non-economic damage caps have a 
lesser effect on decreasing death rates for the elderly. This negative partial effect of non-
economic damages on death rates for the elderly indicates that non-economic damage 
caps, be it medical malpractice or other torts, discriminate against the elderly in more 
than just monetary terms, as the caps are not as beneficial to protecting their lives. These 
two articles indicate, again, that non-economic damage caps may adversely affect a 
particular demographic, in my case the elderly, from taking necessary medical action or 
suing physicians in medical malpractice cases. 
 My study branches out from the existing literature in several important ways. 
First, I am using data from the state of Florida between 1999 and 2009. Within this time 
frame, Florida has one distinct period with no non-economic damage caps imposed and 
another distinct period with a non-economic damage cap. Unlike the cases using the 
Texas Closed Claims Database, I have substantially more data on the time frame with 
non-economic damage caps and do not need to worry as much about the full 
implementation of tort reform. For example, Hyman et al (2009) use a very detailed 
simulation to estimate the effect of Texas’ tort reform passed in 2003 because they only 
have Texas data from 1988 to 2004. Furthermore, the Texas studies only utilize cases that 
have an indemnity payment over $25 thousand when inflation adjusted. In my study I use 
all indemnity payments provided within my dataset. Another difference between my 
study and the Texas literature is that I also have gender data for filed claims, so I have the 
ability to control for gender when examining how elderly claimants are impacted. 
11 Sheperd and Rubin (2008) only consider non-vehicle related deaths. 
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Although Finley (2004) emphasizes non-economic damage caps with respect to gender 
discrimination, I put a lesser emphasis on gender and treat it as a control. She is primarily 
concerned with gender and views age demographics as a secondary concern. 
Additionally, I control for several other economic factors, such as per capita income and 
the percentage of individuals not currently receiving a paycheck at the county and year 
level to determine whether particular counties are more prone to settlement or smaller 
awards in settled cases. Finally, since I do not have individual ages for claimants, I use 
age bins at the county and year-specific level, which allows me to draw inferences about 
the likelihood of settlement at broader level than for a particular age.12 Although this is a 
drawback to my study because I would ideally use individual claimant age, my approach 
to analyzing the impact of non-economic data using county and year level age cohorts 
separates my study from the existing literature quite substantially. 
 
3: Theory and Model of Non-Economic Damages 
 
3.1: Settlement and Payout Theory 
 Before discussing the intricacies of my data and my models, it is appropriate to 
first discuss motivations for applying settlement theory to this paper. Essentially, because 
medical malpractice claims do not follow a random selection process, we can effectively 
compare elderly claimants against non-elderly claimants. The fact that individuals have 
to conscientiously, not randomly, choose to enter the claim process means that claimants 
12 As I will address in Section 4, the current archive from the Florida Closed Claims Database stopped 
providing the age of claimants sometime between 2004 and 2014. I have an outdated version of the FCCD 
extending through 2004 with claimant age, but the 2014 version had age redacted.  
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do not have identical assumptions about their chances of winning compensation, and thus 
we can break down claimants into the categories of elderly and non-elderly.  
 In basic settlement theory between one plaintiff and one defendant, the important 
parameters that determine feasible settlement regions are the expected reward at trial, 
each side’s respective belief about victory in court, and each side’s respective costs of 
litigation. The relationship that determines if settlement is feasible can subsequently be 
written as: 
 
(Eq. 1)                                    �𝑃𝑝 −  𝑃𝐷� ∗ 𝐽 ≤ 𝐶𝑃 + 𝐶𝐷 
 
where the subscripts 𝑝 and 𝐷 stand for plaintiff and defendant, 𝑃 is expected probability 
of the plaintiff winning the case, 𝐽 is the award at trial, and 𝐶 is the cost of litigation. In 
other words, a settlement is reachable if the combined legal costs of the two parties are 
greater than the trial award multiplied by the difference in victory expectations. If the two 
parties have the same exact opinion about the probability of the plaintiff winning the 
case, then theoretically settlement should always be attainable. This settlement theory is 
outlined in more detail by Hay and Spier (1997). One crucial point that Hay and Spier 
(1997) make is that there is a range of settlement values for which both sides should 
theoretically be willing to settle, but bargaining problems may occur over how to 
distribute the gains from settling. Hay and Spier (1997) indicate that the settlement range 
in a basic trial model is: 
 
(Eq. 2)                                     𝑃𝑝 ∗ 𝐽 −  𝐶𝑝  ≤ 𝑆 ≤  𝑃𝐷 + 𝐶𝐷  
17  
                                                                            
This indicates that settlement is possible if the settlement amount is greater than the 
expected gain of the plaintiff and less than the expected loss of the defendant. For the 
sake of simplicity, and remaining focused on non-economic damage caps in Florida, I 
will not consider asymmetric information models detailed by Hay and Spier (1997) and 
Sieg (2000) as to why settlement may break down or not be reached when the above 
equation holds.13 
 Some important takeaways from the basic settlement model are that holding all 
else equal, a lower potential award at trial, 𝐽, makes settlement more likely. Thus, when 
Florida imposed non-economic damage caps in 2003, they artificially lowered the value 
that 𝐽 could attain. For potential elderly claimants in particular, who cannot easily 
recover economic damages because they are not losing wages, the value of 𝐽 can be 
significantly diminished, thus making settlement more likely for elderly claimants. This 
argument hinges on the fact that imposing non-economic damages should theoretically 
not change the probability of victory in medical malpractice cases, and should not change 
the costs of litigation either. 
 
3.2: Application of Settlement Theory 
 Understanding that settlement is more likely with non-economic damage caps, 
lowering the potential award at trial, 𝐽, confounds a multivariate linear regression on the 
13 The general intuition of asymmetric information models is that litigating parties do not go have equal 
information. Defendants or plaintiffs may have information that the other does not, which makes 
potentially breaks down the settlement in a variety of ways. One such way dictated by Hay and Spier 
(1997) is that willingness to settle may be a sign of weakness, so parties may hold out to try and trick the 
other side into believing they have a stronger case. 
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awards paid in settled cases. Due to reverse causality between awards and settlement 
likelihood, a simple regression will ineffectively estimate the effect of non-economic 
damages on payouts to elderly claimants. Essentially, because settlement is more likely 
when non-economic damage caps are in place, we cannot accurately attribute decreasing 
settlement payouts to the limits imposed by non-economic damage caps or the fact that 
settlement is simply more likely and thus the average settlement amount will be lower. 
Problematically, neither relevant scholarly sources nor I found an effective instrument 
that only explained claim payout via the probability of settlement.14 Because I do not 
have an instrument, though, I will use a heavily interacted model to test only whether or 
not areas with higher elderly densities in Florida see significantly smaller awards in 
settled cases when non-economic damage caps have been imposed. I cannot, however, 
firmly attribute any subsequent declines to the non-economic damage law itself. I also 
will construct three linear probability models to measure the degree to which non-
economic damage caps make settlement, filing a case, or dropping a case more likely. 
These three models, which will be discussed in further detail in Section 5, will be the 
basis by which I evaluate the extent to which elderly populations access to the justice 
system is impacted by Florida’s non-economic damage. These three regressions also 
have similar reverse causality issues. For example, if the probability of settlement 
increases, I cannot firmly attribute this change to the non-economic damages or the fact 
that indemnity damage payments are lower. 
 
14 Paik et al. (2010) acknowledged that settlement becomes more likely, but does not provide a remedy for 
eliminating this reverse causality effect. Other papers, such as the work of Silver et al. (2008), are not as 
concerned with the likelihood of settlement, but also acknowledge that settlement is more likely with the 
non-economic damage cap in place. 
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4: Data Description, Limitations, and Summary Statistics 
 
4.1: Data Description 
 I use data from the Florida Closed Claims Database, which has been compiled by 
the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation and is publicly available for purchase. The 
Florida dataset is ideal for my purposes because it contains all medical malpractice 
liability claims from 1975 to the present. Helland and Showalter (2003) note, 
importantly, that insurance companies began supplying more information to the state of 
Florida in 1980, such as the physicians’ specialty in a given case. The Florida Closed 
Claims Database actually is divided into two archives. The first contains data from 1975 
to roughly 1997, and the second holds data from predominantly 1997 to the present. The 
second, more recent archive from 1997 to present contains 93,203 cases. There is, 
however, a considerable degree of overlap between the two files of claims, as the more 
current archive contains some claims stretching as far back as 1992, and some of these 
claim observations are actually in both databases. Given that many cases are duplicate 
cases within the database, assumedly due to the fact multiple plaintiffs can sue for the 
same malpractice, the actual number of cases for the purpose of my study is substantially 
less than 90,000. Numerically, the number of raw duplicates in the dataset is 42,439 
observations. Whittling the useable observations down even more, I only examine data 
from the second archive when the both injury date and the date the case is disposed of are 
both between the years 1999 and 2009, which leaves me with a total of 24,883 
observations for the purpose of my study. 
20  
The archived claims contain key variables such as date of injury occurrence, date 
that a claim was disposed, the severity of the injury, whether or not the case was settled,15 
and the gender of the plaintiff. In regards to payments, the database delineates between 
types of damage payment, such as economic, non-economic, and punitive damages. Also, 
as noted by Vidmar et al. (2005), the database records deductible payments and excess 
payments by insurers. Considering that non-economic damage caps were only instituted 
in Florida in 2003, this rich dataset provides ample information to compare pre-cap 
awards in medical malpractice cases to post-cap awards. Even more notably, Florida has 
a reputation as a prime destination for retired, elderly Americans. Thus, having the 
complete closed claims database for Florida makes my findings on the elderly especially 
relevant. If there are significant effects of non-economic damage caps on counties with 
high elderly densities in Florida, where the sample size of elderly Americans is likely 
quite large, then making extrapolations outside of Florida may be more prudent because 
there is a large enough sample of elderly claimants to draw conclusions beyond the state 
of Florida. 
 Other pieces of data that I use within this paper come from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data of the St. Louis Federal Reserve and the United States Census. 
Specifically, the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) is used to provide per capita 
income levels for individual counties in Florida dating between 1999 and 2009. I also 
used the County and City Data Book provided by the U.S. Census to gather data on the 
size of the civilian labor force, civilian labor force unemployment, and age demographics 
at both the county and year level from 1999 to 2009. Using this data that I gathered, I am 
15 And, if the case was settled, the database also records at what stage of the litigation process the case was 
settled 
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able to construct a series of explanatory variables for my model in Section 5. The full 
description of explanatory and control variables can found in Appendix B. 
 
4.2: Data Limitations 
Despite the rich amount of data and information the Florida Closed Claims 
Database provides, it does have several notable limitations that should be addressed. First 
and foremost, the Florida Closed Claims Database has now redacted claimant age, likely 
due to privacy issues. In a previous dataset from the Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation spanning cases closed through the year 2004, age was provided. I opted not to 
use this data source for my direct analysis because the non-economic damage cap was 
enacted in late 2003, which means too few claims would have occurred, and proceeded 
through the legal system, to effectively analyze the effect of the non-economic damage 
cap. Using this older dataset would make me encounter the same problem that Hyman et 
al. (2009) encounters by having a long enough sample period after the non-economic 
damage cap has been imposed in Florida. As such, I had to reconstruct age demographics 
at the county and year level using the County and City Data Book for the more expansive 
dataset. The age demographic data from the County and City Data Book only provided 
distinct age demographic figures for each county between 2000 and 2009, so I used the 
compound growth rate over this period to extrapolate the age demographic figures for the 
year 1999. The fact that the database no longer provides the plaintiff’s age restricts my 
ability to make exact judgments on whether or not elderly populations are statistically 
impacted by non-economic damage caps. 
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Furthermore, as indicated by both Sieg (2000) and Hay and Spier (1997) in 
Section 3, above, of my paper, standard settlement models indicate that when the amount 
of damages that can be claimed at trial are lower, settlement is more likely. I cannot be 
positive that the changes in payout per claim in trial or settlement are due strictly to non-
economic damage caps. Understanding this source of bias, my results will likely 
overestimate the effect of non-economic damage caps. This dataset does not provide me 
with an instrument to effectively diminish the reverse causality between settlement 
likelihood and claim payout in settled cases, and thus non-economic damage caps will 
likely account for variation in settlement probability and payout size that should be 
attributed to this reverse causality. There remains a distinct possibility that elderly 
payouts dropped simply because settlement is more likely. Another potential limitation of 
this data source is that it does not provide the lawyer or law firm that represents the 
claimant. It would be interesting to examine if different law firms were less likely to take 
on elderly cases as a result of the non-economic damage cap. Finally, the Florida Closed 
Claims database does not explicitly claim whether or not the non-economic damage law 
is in effect at any point of the data. This makes determining exactly what cases apply 
under the non-economic damage cap difficult. For simplicity, because the law went into 
effect September 15th, 2003, I consider all cases in 2003 to be exempt from non-
economic damages, and all cases after 2004 to have the damage cap imposed.  
 
4.3: Summary Statistics 
 Table 1, presented in Appendix C, presents general summary statistics for my 
sample. Column 1 summarizes my entire dataset from 1999 to 2009. In order to give a 
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better perspective of the era prior to non-economic damage caps being instituted in 
Florida, Column 2 presents the same set of summary statistics for claims where the injury 
happened in the period 1999-2003 (pre-reform). Column 3, subsequently, presents 
summary statistics for claims where the injury happened in the period 2004-2009 (post-
reform).The significance stars in Column 3 are individual t-test’s for a difference of 
means between the sample of cases occurring before 2004 and the sample occurring after 
2004. The bottom of Table 1 displays the significance level of the t-test for each 
respective variable. 
 In particular, Column 1 of Table 1 demonstrates that the average indemnity 
payment by an insurance company to a claimant, adjusted for inflation, in settled cases is 
well over $200 thousand. This gives a quantitative measure for the significance of these 
medical malpractice liability claims; the payout per claim is a sizeable sum of money. 
Furthermore, the weighted average through the sample at the county and year level 
illustrates that roughly 17% of the population is over 65. This is the primary sample of 
people I am focused on throughout this study, and the more defined age bins are 
employed as a means of robustness testing for the impact of non-economic damages with 
finer age distinctions. Additionally, it is important to note that within these summary 
statistics, per capita income, no paycheck ratio, and age demographics are weighted 
towards more frequently cited counties in the database. For example, large counties like 
Miami-Dade likely have a larger influence on the mean and standard deviation of the 
sample because there are more medical malpractice claims from these more populated 
areas. Considering this weighting, it is interesting that Column 2 and Column 3 show that 
the inflation adjusted weighted per capita income in Florida is actually lower post-reform, 
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and the no paycheck ratio is higher. This signals that the claims made in Florida after 
2003 came from areas with lower average incomes and higher no paycheck ratios. 
Intuitively, this may indicate that a worsening economic condition or that poor medical 
care in less thriving counties in Florida will have a significant effect on medical 
malpractice liability claims and payouts. 
 Interestingly, the inflation adjusted indemnity in the second sample period is 
significantly lower by roughly $63 thousand on average. More prudently, the difference 
in means t-test implies that this discrepancy is very significant, which in turn indicates 
that post-reform indemnity payments have certainly shrunk. This could be because the 
severity of injuries is statistically smaller between 2004 and 2009, but could also be 
partially attributable to the effect of non-economic damage caps. Conversely, Column 3 
indicates that fewer cases are settled in the post-reform sample. In fact, Columns 2 and 
Column 3 display that only 52% of post-reform claims, compared to 59% of pre-reform 
claims, were settled. This opposes my initial hypothesis, and my theory section, 
advocating for a higher percentage of settled cases due to lower payment possibilities. 
This does not mean, however, that the non-economic damage caps result in more 
settlements. In all likelihood, more cases involving predominantly economic damages 
were claimed during the post-reform era. This may indicate that, although we have no 
direct means of testing it with this dataset, fewer cases heavily dependent upon non-
economic damages even have claims made because potential claimants have lower 
payout potential. Another interesting comparison between Column 2 and Column 3 
shows that many more cases are filed in the post-reform period. Similar to settlement 
theory, more stringent non-economic damage caps would expectedly lower the likelihood 
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of filing a claim with the insurance company. Again, since potential payouts have 
decreased, the small cost of filing a claim becomes less attractive, which would indicate 
that filing a claim becomes less likely after non-economic damage caps are instituted.  
More in line with expectations, almost twice as many cases are dropped in the 
post-reform sample, and about twice as many cases actually go to trial in the pre-reform 
period. Both of these differences are significant at the 1% level. Non-economic damage 
caps were put into effect partially to lower the number of frivolous lawsuits, so I expect 
that fewer cases actually make it to trial since claims of lesser merit will not progress as 
far in the legal system. Likewise, I expect cases that are dropped, which implies that the 
case never went to trial and the plaintiff didn’t get paid, to be higher after 2004 because 
insurance companies will more easily discard low quality claims. Unlike the pre-reform 
period, where potential questionable lawsuits could progress through the legal system 
unhindered, non-economic damage caps make it more likely for less deserving claims to 
be discarded with little to no payment. The final aspect of Column 2 and Column 3 to 
note is that while the finer age demographics of Florida are quite significantly different in 
the pre-reform and post-reform era, the percentage of the population over 65 has an 
insignificant t-value, implying that the weighted elderly density of Florida was likely 
static in my two sample periods. This is likely attributable to the fact that most elderly 
people in Florida are within the elderly1 age bracket, which also has no statistical 
evidence of being different in the two sample periods. elderly2 and elderly3 are smaller 
age cohorts, so they did not have enough influence to effectively demonstrate the elderly 
density was significantly changed. For reference, all summary statistic tables and 
regression outputs are located in Appendix C. 
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4.4: Demographic Statistics and Maps 
 Because much of the data I gathered was at the county and year level for the 
individual counties of Florida in years 1999-2009, the summary statistics for variables 
such as no paycheck, per capita income, and elderly density (labeled Over 65) simply 
provide a weighted average of each variable, depending on how frequently a particular 
county or year is seen within the dataset. In other words, the summary statistics do not 
provide a balanced picture of these economic or demographic variables. To give a better 
sense of county differences in my key variables, Figure 1, in Appendix D, color-
coordinates the average percentage of elderly people within a particular county. To 
calculate the proportion of elderly population by county, I took the average proportion of 
elderly citizens over my designated time frame of 1999-2009. As expected, southern and 
central Florida have the highest average proportion of elderly people. These are the areas 
that are typically coveted as retirement locations for their warm weather. 
Correspondingly, the Florida panhandle, which is not typically viewed as a desirable 
location for elderly individuals, has relatively few elderly people as a percentage of their 
total population. For reference, all future figures can also be found in Appendix D. 
 Additionally, Figure 2 displays the average, inflation-adjusted, per capita income 
by county on a similar map. Notably, many of the areas with high densities of elderly 
people also appear to be wealthier counties. This is not shocking for two reasons. First, I 
assume that, similar to common sentiments, many elderly citizens who chose to move to 
Florida are fairly wealthy. Secondly, since these counties with higher elderly densities are 
typically seen as having attractive weather conditions, I also assume that wealthy 
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individuals are likely to reside in these areas which spur more lucrative businesses to 
locate in these areas. As such, I would expect per capita income to be higher in these 
areas. Many of the low income counties in Florida, most notably in north Florida, have a 
low proportion of elderly individuals. There is likely no external flow of elderly people to 
these low-income areas because they do not provide the amenities, weather, or 
community that the affluent areas of central and southern Florida offer.  
Finally, Figure 3 presents the average percentage of county residents that do not 
regularly receive a paycheck. As indicated in Appendix B, the no paycheck ratio variable 
attempts to measure what percentage of individuals would be ineligible for economic 
damages in a medical malpractice lawsuit. Since these individuals are unemployed in the 
civilian labor force or not even in the labor force, they assumedly are not receiving 
paychecks from an employer. Figure 3 highlights that, as expected, the majority of 
counties with a high no paycheck ratio tends to have lower per capita income. Counties 
with high no paycheck ratios are usually the result of a lower employment rate. In 
essence then, Figure 3 shows a noticeable correlation with Figure 2, which indicates that 
both variables appear to be indicators of economic well-being at the county level in 
Florida. Interestingly, most counties with high ratios of people not receiving a paycheck 
have a low elderly population density. Although this may seem counterintuitive, it is 
important to note that the no paycheck ratio essentially seeks to merge economic health 
with elderly density. In this case, Figure 3 simply shows that economic health is a better 
indicator of the percentage of people not receiving a paycheck than the proportion of 
elderly individuals. In addition, considering that many people over the age of 65 remain 
in the workplace, this no paycheck map is useful mainly for indicating that elderly people 
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typically live in wealthier areas where a higher percentage of the population is employed 
in the civilian labor force. 
 The main takeaway from Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 is to demonstrate there 
is substantial demographic and economic variation between counties within Florida. 
Notably, the average elderly density per county spans from 8% to 33%, whereas the 
average per capita income per county ranges between roughly $14 thousand to $48 
thousand. Clearly, within Florida alone, there is substantial variation that validates my 
decision to examine county level data as an alternative to actual age data. Additionally, 
the substantial county level variation in my key demographic and economic variables 
indicates that the panel data I utilize comes from a very diverse population, thus 
diminishing the likelihood my data does not come from a homogeneous population. This 
heterogeneous population in Florida allows me to effectively utilize my synthetic panel, 
which I will discuss further in Section 5. 
 My final portion of data analysis regards how well my county and year level age 
cohorts align with the actual age distributions seen in a fraction of the Florida Closed 
Claims Database. As mentioned in Section 4.1, I have a dated version of the Florida 
Closed Claims Database that contains roughly 8,700 claims that were disposed between 
the years 1999 and 2004, which conveniently fits into the time frame of my sample. 
Importantly, this dataset has the age of the claimant when the medical malpractice 
occurred. Thus, to measure whether or not my age demographic findings from the County 
and City Data Book closely correlate to the actual ages of claimants filing cases in 
Florida, I broke down the abridged Florida Closed Claims Database by the percentage of 
claimants over the age of 65 by county and year. I then compared each subsequent 
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proportion16 to the elderly density I created from the City and County Data Book between 
1999 and 2004. Figure 4 displays the scatterplot of these two ratios with a 45 degree line 
imposed on it to demonstrate how the two would ideally correlate. Figure 4 shows that 
while my probability-based approximation for the age of a claimant in my dataset is not a 
perfect solution, the relationship is clearly positive, with a correlation coefficient of 
roughly .4877 and an R-squared value of roughly .237. This low R-squared value, 
though, indicates that my regression results will likely contain lots of noise and not be 
perfectly representative of the population in Florida. One reason for this discrepancy 
between the age cohort data and the actual age breakdown seen in the old database could 
be that I have limited the timeframe of my sample. Perhaps with a larger timeframe the 
county and year level elderly density would better correlate with actual claimant age. 
Additionally, the relatively low R-squared could be attributable to smaller counties 
having a small number of claims, and thus proportion of elderly claimants are quite 
volatile. I tried to account for this by excluding county and year combinations with no 
elderly cases or more than 50% elderly cases, but this still leaves a fair amount of 
possible variation. Contrarily, my age cohort data is concerned with elderly density, so it 
does not account for some counties only providing a few cases to the claims database in a 
given county and year. To account for the relative representation of each county within 
the dataset, I also ran a simple linear regression at the claim level of elderly density at the 
county level on the observed probability of an individual claim being elderly. Although 
this regression effectively accounts for larger counties more than smaller counties, the R-
16 I did exclude these proportions when they equaled 0 or were greater than 50, though, because of the 
scarcity of samples stratified by county and year. With so few cases in some county and year combinations, 
I only considered combinations I felt were more representative of the true population. 
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squared value for this regression was only .2469.17 This again validates my belief that my 
approximation for the elderly population is not perfect, and thus my regressions and 
takeaways will be impacted by the noise of my imperfect representation of Florida’s 
demographics.  
 
5: Methodology, Model, and Results 
 
5.1: Methodology for Regressions 
 Following Paik et al. (2010), my model analyzes whether or not the elderly are 
negatively impacted by the imposition of non-economic damage caps in medical 
malpractice cases by estimating models of the following form using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS):  
 
(Eq. 3)      𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡) +  𝛽2(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 ×  𝛿𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝛿𝑖𝑡) +  𝜃𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 represents the dependent variable at time t and in county k. 𝛽0 is a constant 
term, 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 is one of my three major independent variables, 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
whether or not non-economic damages are present in this year, 𝜃𝑖 is a vector of control 
variables encompassing a gender dummy variable and nine injury severity dummy 
17 This R-Squared value still excludes county and year combinations where there were no elderly claimants 
or where over 50% of the claimants were elderly. I keep this criterion to stay consistent with the data I use 
in Figure 4. 
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variables,18 and 𝛼𝑡 is a vector of time-fixed effects. As I will elaborate on later, I use 
clustered standard errors to account for with county variation over time periods. 
In order to comprehensively analyze the effect of non-economic damage caps on 
the elderly, 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 will be different in subsequent regressions. In my first set of OLS 
regressions, 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 will be the natural log of the inflation adjusted total paid indemnity by 
the insurance company in settled claims. This variable is crucial to measure because it 
will directly predict how much more an individual from a county with many elderly 
people will receive in settled claims. I use the natural log of this variable due to the 
positive skew of the total paid indemnity data, and as mentioned in Appendix B, I 
inflation adjust the indemnity payments using 1999 as the base year. The next three 
fundamental regressions employ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 as linear probability models referencing the 
likelihood that a case is settled, that a case is filed, and that a case is dropped.  
Additionally, because I am interested in the partial effect of the elderly density 
(Over 65), no paycheck ratio, and per capita income within a particular county and year, 
the coefficient 𝛽1 and the independent variable 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 refer to three possible variables in 
each regression on my four dependent variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡.
19 The first case for 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the 
proportion of the population that is elderly in a particular county and year. The second 
rendition of 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 is the no paycheck ratio, and the third value that 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 takes is the natural 
log of inflation adjusted per capita income. Although the per capita income distribution is 
not too heavily skewed, I chose to use the natural log of this value in order to interpret 
my regression coefficients as elasticity measures when compared to natural log of 
18 As mentioned in the data descriptions in Appendix A, injury severity has a value between 1 and 10, so I 
consider nine injury severity dummy variables to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
19 The four OLS regression of 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 , as stated before, are natural log of total paid indemnity, probability of 
settling a claim, probability of filing a claim, and probability of dropping a claim. 
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indemnity payments. These models will hereafter be referred to as the “basic model(s)”. 
Each of the four basic models for different 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 have three individual regressions for each 
independent variable 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡. 
The term 𝛽2 references the coefficient of the interaction of  𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡 with the non-
economic damage cap dummy, denoted 𝛿𝑖𝑡. As referenced in Appendix B, this dummy 
variable equals 1 between the years 2004 and 2009, and equals 0 before 2004.  The term 
𝛽3 references the coefficient given strictly to the non-economic damage cap dummy 
variable. Because my model includes 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡,  𝛿𝑖𝑡, and the interaction of these two variables, 
I am chiefly concerned with the coefficient of 𝛽2 as the partial effect of the non-economic 
damage cap on my independent variable of interest. As mentioned above, the term 𝜃𝑖 
references a vector of control variables, specifically controlling for gender of the claimant 
and the severity of the individual injury that is sustained20. Finally, 𝛼𝑡 references time-
fixed effects between 1999 and 2009 based on the year that the case was disposed of. 
After running a series of basic models, I run a fourth regression of each 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 using 
all three independent variables and their respective interactions. The reasoning for 
running an OLS regression combining all three of these independent variables is to truly 
isolate the effect that elderly claimants experience due to non-economic damage caps. I 
will, henceforth, refer to this model as the “complex model,” which takes the following 
form: 
 
(Eq. 4)       𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑚(𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑡) +  𝛽𝑛(𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑡 ×  𝛿𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝛿𝑖𝑡) +  𝜃𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 
 
20 Injury severity ranges from 1-10, and I chose to make injury severity act as a state-fixed effect. 
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where all variables have the same meaning except for 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑡, which now is a vector of the 
elderly density, no paycheck ratio, and natural log of per capita income with regression 
coefficients equaling 𝛽𝑚 for the variable itself and 𝛽𝑛 for the interaction term. As in the 
basic model, I also use clustered standard errors in the complex model. My chief concern 
in this model is the coefficient 𝛽𝑛 when 𝜏𝑖𝑘𝑡 refers to the elderly density. Again, this 
coefficient highlights the partial effect of the non-economic damage cap for the elderly 
density of a given county and year.  
 The complex model is crucial to the greater understanding the effect of non-
economic damage caps on the elderly because this complex model effectively controls for 
attributes that I could falsely attribute to age demographics. Thus, in the complex model, 
the no paycheck ratio and natural log of per capita income become crucial control 
variables rather than key explanatory variables.  
One intricacy of my data and my model is that I use a synthetic panel to make my 
model as representative as possible of the Florida population. The basic idea around a 
synthetic panel, as indicated by Dang and Lanjouw (2013), is that one can develop panel 
data out of a series of cross-sectional data sources.21 Since I do not have individual 
claimant age in our panel data, I use a synthetic panel to mimic the demographics of 
residents of Florida at a county and year level. Thus, while I cannot determine whether a 
claimant is elderly or not, I can use the relative proportion of elderly people in a specific 
county, in a specific year, to estimate the effects of noneconomic damage caps on the 
elderly. Likewise, I can use other control variables at both a county and year level to 
21 Dang and Lanjouw (2013) comment that synthetic panels are most widely used for poverty 
investigations, mainly due to the difficulty of following individuals through time. Essentially, synthetic 
panels allow one to follow age cohorts through time rather than focusing on individuals. 
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make the synthetic panel representative of the Florida population on a year-over-year 
basis. The benefit of my synthetic panel is that it allows me to examine age bins rather 
than individual claimant age, which I do not have, in order to measure the effect of non-
economic damage caps on said age bins. Thus, while not having an actual age variable is 
still a sizeable drawback, my use of a synthetic panel is an appropriate solution given the 
nature of my data. 
Another issue worthy of addressing is the potential for my model to violate OLS 
assumptions. Most notably, OLS regressions typically assume that error terms are 
independent of each other. Because many of my variables are at a county level,22 the 
errors in my regressions are likely not independent due to the correlation between values 
in the same county. This has the potential to be fairly substantial problem because Florida 
has 67 counties, and my subset of data specifically has claims filed in 65 counties. My 
use of a synthetic panel at the county level to approximate for the age profiles of Florida 
citizens prompts me to accurately account for the fact that county level data points are 
likely highly related. To remedy this issue, I use clustered regressions by county, which 
effectively remedies the problem with having data points based at the county level. 
Essentially, clustering my regressions utilizes heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
with the additional benefit of accounting for inter-relatedness of variables within a 
particular county, which diminishes sources of possible homoscedasticity within my data. 
My use of the synthetic panel and clustered regressions both seek to reduce the noise in 
my analysis due to the imperfections of my dataset. 
 
22 Three crucial independent variables, proportion of the population over 65, No Paycheck ratio, and per 
capita income, all are gathered at the county level.  
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5.2: Regressions Results 
Reiterating my general hypotheses of the regressions, I hypothesize that, similar 
to the expectations of literature like Paik et al. (2010) and Finley (2004), a higher 
proportion of elderly people at a county and year level will receive lower indemnity 
payments at settlement, be more likely to settle claims, be less likely to file claims, and 
be more likely to drop claims. Considering the general settlement theory discussed in 
Section 3, claimants should be wary of filing claims, which would lead to more cases 
being dropped before going to trial or contending seriously to go to trial. Similarly, I 
expect that county and year combinations with a higher no paycheck ratio will register 
the same partial effects as having a high proportion of elderly people; having no 
paycheck indicates that economic damages are much less likely to be a major percentage 
of the possible damages in a claim. With regards to per capita income at a county and 
year level, medical malpractice cases in wealthier areas are likely to see higher payouts 
due to higher economic losses awarded, and thus also see fewer settlements, more cases 
filed, and fewer cases dropped. This hypothesis is grounded in the fact that those areas 
with higher per capita income, as seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, typically have higher 
employment rates as well. Thus, areas with lower per capita income and higher no 
paycheck ratios likely will correspond to areas that rely more heavily on the benefits of 
non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases. 
 Table 2 presents coefficients and t-statistic (in parentheticals) based on Equation 3 
when the dependent variable is the size of the inflation-adjusted indemnity that insurance 
companies pay out in settled cases. For simplicity, I have omitted two control variables, 
the severity of the injury and the year the case was disposed, from the regression table. 
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Because I considered severity code and year disposed as state and time-fixed effects, 
respectively, I do not feel it is imperative to report the coefficients and standard errors for 
these terms.  
It can be seen that, when examining the three basic models in Columns 1-3 of 
Table 2, only per capita income has a statistically significant effect on the size of the 
insurance company’s indemnity payment in these settled cases. Because both terms are in 
natural logs, the coefficient for per capita income implies that a 1% increase in per capita 
income (for a given county and year where the medical malpractice occurred) results in a 
.391% larger indemnity. This result is not surprising, considering that these claimants 
with a higher per capita income likely have more economic damage claims and are less 
impacted by the non-economic damage caps enacted in 2003. In the more complex 
regression in Column 4, though, the effect of living in a wealthier county is even more 
pronounced and more significant, as a 1% increase in adjusted per capita income results 
in a predicted .691% larger indemnity. More notably, though, the no paycheck ratio and 
the proportion of the population over 65, as well as their interaction terms, appear to have 
statistically insignificant coefficients, with the exception of the elderly density in the 
complex model, which shows a fairly strongly significant negative coefficient at the 1% 
level. This coefficient implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
elderly people in a given county and year tends to drop the indemnity payment by 1.39%. 
The interpretation of this coefficient shows that areas with higher elderly densities tend to 
receive smaller payouts, and considering that the average indemnity size over 1999-2009 
was over $240 thousand, a 1.39% decrease is a substantial sum of money. Interestingly, 
the effect of having a higher elderly density in a county and year combination is 
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insignificant when interacted with the non-economic damage cap dummy variable. This 
seemingly implies that, controlling for all other variables within the complex model, a 
higher elderly density results in smaller indemnity payments regardless of non-economic 
damage caps being in place.  
The findings of both Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 2 are in line with the 
findings of Silver et al. (2008), Hyman et al. (2009), and Paik et al. (2010) that the 
difference in indemnity payment is insignificant between elderly and non-elderly 
claimants. This could be a sign that Florida’s medical malpractice law is discriminating 
against the elderly in a means not related to the size of the indemnity payment, such as 
the probability of even entering the medical malpractice legal system. The general 
takeaway from Table 2, though, indicates that non-economic damages do not 
significantly enhance the deleterious effect of elderly density on the size of the settled 
payout, as the interaction term is still insignificant. To show the degree of insignificance 
in the complex model, the F-Test testing whether or not Nonecon * Over 65, Nonecon * 
No Paycheck, and Nonecon * Ln Per Capita Income adj all are simultaneously equal to 
zero is 1.87, which implies a 14.37% chance all are equal to zero. This seemingly shows 
that the non-economic damage cap does not impact the size of insurance company 
indemnity payments. This opposes my hypothesis, but this finding may be the result of 
the non-economic damage cap effectively filtering worthy cases into the medical 
malpractice system. If this were the case, then the size of indemnity payments rightly is 
unaffected.  
Moving on, the first linear probability model displayed in Table 3, which 
examines the probability of a given claim being settled, displays rather puzzling results. 
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Whereas per capita income was significant for the indemnity size, Column 3 highlights 
that per capita income, and the interaction of per capita income and non-economic 
damage caps being in place, in a given county and year has no statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood of an individual claimant settling their case out of court. Similar 
to Table 2, the no paycheck ratio is again insignificant in estimating the probability of 
settlement in both the basic and complex models in Column 2 and 4, respectively. Most 
puzzling, though, both the basic model looking at just elderly density in Column 1 and 
the complex model in Column 4 indicate that high-density elderly counties are 
statistically significantly less likely to settle claims.23 Similar to the findings of Table 2, 
this significance indicates that the higher elderly density typically corresponds to fewer 
settlements. However, since the interaction between non-economic damage caps and my 
three independent variables of interest are statistically insignificant and provide no useful 
insight, it appears that settlement likelihood does not change as elderly density increases 
due to the imposition of the non-economic damage cap.  One aspect of such a finding to 
consider is that, assuming elderly people typically have a lower likelihood of still 
working and receiving a paycheck, they likely have amassed greater wealth by working 
for a long period of time in the past. This may mean that incurring the legal costs of a 
trial and not settling a case may be more acceptable since legal costs are not cutting into 
actual income, but rather pre-existing wealth.  
One final interesting aspect of Table 3 is the impact of gender. In all regressions 
the gender control coefficient is significant at the 1% level and consistently indicates that 
males are about 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to settle medical malpractice cases. 
23 Although, as Table 3 displays, this figure is weakly significant at the 5% level. 
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This indicates that males are much less likely to settle claims. This may be a function of 
males typically suffering worse injuries in the dataset24 or could be more psychologically 
based in that men are typically believed to be more competitive, and thus may act less 
rationally in a settlement situation. Despite the gender peculiarity, though, the F-statistic 
for whether all three interaction terms in the complex model equal zero is .78, with a 
probability of almost 51% that all simultaneously equal zero. 
Some explanations for the results in Table 3 are that counties with higher elderly 
density may be less likely to settle cases because elderly patients have less to lose by 
going avoiding a settlement. As elderly life expectancy decreases, the litigation costs of 
trial may not be as much of a burden, especially if the medical malpractice shortened 
their life expectancy even further. Another possible reason that counties with more 
elderly people may see fewer settlements is that these claimants are deterred from even 
filing a medical malpractice claim. Harkening back to Section 3, if settlement becomes 
more likely due to lower expected, or feasible, payouts, then we would expect fewer 
elderly people to even bother filing a claim with the insurance company. Rationally 
speaking, if elderly individuals know that the gains from potentially costly litigation are 
low and are aware that they do not have a solid claim under the restrictions of the non-
economic damage cap, filing a claim may be an avoidable expense. Or, likewise, non-
economic damage caps may promote insurance companies to pay feasible claims made 
by the elderly before they can ever be filed. Since non-economic damage caps should 
theoretically flush out some of the less deserving claims, insurance companies have 
24 Within the data, the severity code average for males is 5.99, while the severity code average for females 
is 5.35. A t-test of means indicates that this difference in injury severity is very significant, which may 
account for why men are less likely to settle. 
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incentive to compensate the elderly claims that are in fact brought to their attention. As 
such, elderly claimants could witness fewer settlements because the cases that are filed 
are, in all likelihood, quite disputed cases that will not be settled easily.25 One final piece 
of reasoning for the noted increase in settlement likelihood is that the threat of potentially 
massive non-economic damage awards, whether by jury or in settlement, is what 
incentivizes insurance companies to take medical malpractice cases more seriously. Thus, 
when the potential threat of non-economic damages are reduced due to caps, insurance 
companies may dig their heels in more and refuse to settle. If this speculation were 
accurate, we could feasibly see settlements as less likely to occur due to the relaxation of 
risk aversion angst by insurance companies.  
 Examining Table 4, which is a summary of the linear probability model 
measuring the likelihood of filing a claim, my theorized situation appears to be very 
likely. Columns 1 and Column 4 indicate that the interaction between elderly proportion 
and the non-economic dummy is significant at the 1% level and the 5% level in the basic 
model and the complex model, respectively. The fact that counties with higher elderly 
densities appear to file fewer claims due to non-economic damages being imposed seems 
to support the findings of both Burstin et al. (1993) and Sager et al. (1990). The complex 
model in Column 4 of Table 4 happens to show the most significant results, as the F-
statistic for all three interaction terms equaling zero in the complex model is 6.47, with a 
virtually 0% chance that all are equal to zero. In the basic model, a higher density of 
elderly people during the period with non-economic damages implies that a 1 percentage 
25 By “disputed” I imply that non-economic damage caps may flush out frivolous medical malpractice 
cases, which indicates that filing a claim is less likely to begin with. Of the claims that get filed, then, they 
are less likely to be settled because they are stronger cases. 
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point increase in elderly proportion leads to a .5 percentage point decrease in the chance 
of filing a claim, and this same coefficient implies a .8 percentage point decrease in the 
complex model. This appears to confirm the idea that non-economic damage caps made 
claims made in counties with a higher elderly density less likely to even file claims. This 
also bolsters the theory that settlement in high elderly density areas is less likely because 
claims are less likely to be filed, especially during the post-reform period. Additionally, 
the basic regression in Column 2 regarding the no paycheck ratio demonstrates that after 
the non-economic damage cap was imposed, the higher proportion of individuals in a 
given county and a given year without a paycheck will result in a lower probability, 
roughly .5 percentage points, of claims being filed. 
The findings from Table 4 are generally consistent with my hypothesis and the 
relevant literature, considering that people without an income stream would have less 
incentive to file claims when they cannot recover as much at trial or in a settlement. 
Notably, Column 2 indicates that the general effect of having a higher no paycheck ratio 
leads to more cases being filed at a very significant .1% level, although the likelihood of 
filing a claim only drops by about .3 percentage points for a 1 percentage point increase 
in the proportion of people not getting a paycheck in county and year combination. This 
may be a result of areas with fewer employed individuals experiencing worse healthcare 
due to their lower income levels, and likely worse medical expertise in the area which 
would encourage individuals to file more claims. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the 
complex model indicates that during the non-economic damage period, a higher per 
capita income at the county and year level results in a higher likelihood of cases being 
filed. While this term is significant, a 1% increase in per capita income only results in a 
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.001 percentage point increase in the likelihood of filing a claim. This trend can likely be 
attributed to the fact that wealthier counties are more likely to have individuals with 
disposable income streams, so filing a claim is a fairly insubstantial cost to them. During 
the non-economic damage cap period specifically, though, a higher income may allow 
claimants to re-classify their damage claim as economic damages rather than non-
economic damages, which would encourage claim filing for wealthier people. 
A final important figure to recognize in Table 4 is the significance of the non-
economic damage cap dummy in Column 1 and Column 2. The positive coefficient on 
this term means that the non-economic damage caps correlate to a higher probability of 
filing a claim. The magnitude of this coefficient is especially shocking, as claims are 
roughly 57 percentage points (Column 1) and 76 percentage points (Column 2) more 
likely to be filed between 2004 and 2009 than 1999-2003. My summary statistics from 
Table 1 showed that many more cases were filed post-reform, and thus this positive 
correlation is crucial to compare to the elderly density interaction coefficient discussed 
earlier; non-economic damage caps generally imply that filing a claim is more likely, but 
for areas with higher densities of elderly individuals, the probability of filing a claim 
actually decreases. Importantly, the complex model seems to dull the effects of non-
economic damage caps on the likelihood of filing, which may indicate that including all 
three county and year level data series is crucial to identifying the negative, or even null, 
effect of non-economic damage caps on the likelihood of filing a claim.26 
26 Column 4 indicates that when controlling for all three county/year variables the partial, effect of the non-
economic damage cap is actually negative and insignificant. Therefore the complex model seems to refute 
the takeaway from two basic models. 
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The final OLS linear probability model that I ran was on the likelihood of a claim 
being dropped in Table 5. As more descriptively defined in Appendix B, a claim is 
considered dropped when a claim did not go to trial and resulted in no indemnity 
payment by the insurance company. Table 5 highlights that fairly few of my important 
independent variables are significant in changing the likelihood of dropping a claim. In 
fact, the density of elderly populations appears completely insignificant in both the basic 
and the complex model. Somewhat expectedly, a higher no paycheck ratio showed a 
significant positive effect on the likelihood of dropping a case. This coefficient seems to 
indicate that regardless of non-economic damages, the higher proportion of those not in 
the civilian labor force and those unemployed peoples in the civilian labor force 
corresponds to more dropped claims, although a 1 percentage point increase in the no 
paycheck ratio corresponds to just a .2 percentage point drop in the likelihood of 
dropping the claim. This may be attributable to the fact that these areas are typically 
poorer and may not be able to withstand the costly litigation process in order to receive 
payment for a claim. Areas with a high density of people not receiving a paycheck could 
also be more likely to file, and subsequently drop, frivolous claims. I should note, 
however, that in the complex model the no paycheck ratio is seemingly insignificant, 
which shows that the true effect of not earning a paycheck on the likelihood of filing a 
claim is likely insignificant.  
Moving forward, it appears that the per capita income coefficient is highly 
significant.27 Both coefficients from Column 3 and Column 4 strongly imply that county 
and year combinations with a higher per capita income are substantially less likely to 
27 This coefficient is significant at the .1% level and 1% level in the basic model and complex model, 
respectively.  
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drop a claim, where a 1 percentage point increase corresponds to a probability decrease 
by 8 percentage points and 6 percentage points, respectively. This may be attributable to 
the fact that counties with richer individuals are more willing to incur the costs of 
litigation to settle a claim or fight in court. Also, as established in Table 2, since richer 
areas tend to get larger payouts in settlements, dropping a case has a higher opportunity 
cost for individuals in these wealthier counties. Importantly, though, the effect of per 
capita income on dropping a case does not depend on non-economic damage caps being 
in place, as displayed by the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term in Column 3 
and Column 4. Furthermore, similar to the results of Table 4, the non-economic damage 
cap dummy has a highly significant effect in the basic models for elderly proportion and 
for the no paycheck ratio. In both cases, non-economic damage caps are expected to 
increase the likelihood of dropping a case by well over 15 percentage points. Intriguingly, 
though, in the complex model the sign on the non-economic damage caps coefficient is 
again negative and insignificant, indicating that the true effect of the non-economic 
damage cap is not clear. Finally, the F-test for the interaction variables in this case 
indicate that all three have a 14.3% chance of simultaneously equaling zero, which 
thrusts doubt into whether or not the proportion of elderly people, or any explanatory 
variables of interest for that matter, have any effect on the probability of dropping a 
claim. 
Overall, the results of my four primary regressions do not show exceedingly 
convincing results that non-economic damage caps negatively impact counties with more 
elderly populations. In fact, only the results of the linear probability model predicting the 
likelihood of filing a case demonstrated that the interaction of the elderly density and the 
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non-economic damage period had a statistically significant impact. I did identify, 
however, that elderly people, regardless of the economic damage cap, were statistically 
less likely to settle cases and typically received smaller indemnity payments in 
settlements. These results do not give insight into the effect of the non-economic damage 
cap, though. In fact, the per capita income at the county and year level actually appeared 
to be the most consistently significant term throughout my regression analysis. Claims 
filed in areas and years with a higher per capita income resulted in statistically significant 
larger settlements, and when interacted with the non-economic damage cap showed 
significantly higher probability of filing a case and lower probability of dropping a case.  
Furthermore, in the complex model, the non-economic damage cap term was never 
significant which shrouds the impact of imposing the cap on changing medical 
malpractice behavior. 
 
5.3: Robustness Testing 
 My method of testing the robustness of my results is primarily concerned with 
breaking down my age variable into a handful of age demographic bins. Rather than 
strictly consider the proportion of a counties population in a particular year over the age 
of 65, I instead broke down this term into 10 age bins, with most measuring the 
proportion of the population within a 10-year age bin. As mentioned earlier, Appendix B 
contains the definition and range of each age bin. The more intense stratification of age 
demographic densities are useful because it allows me to see whether the expected effect 
of non-economic damages is corresponds to the life cycle of wages. Since both the very 
young and the elderly do not receive a paycheck, and hence should rely more heavily on 
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non-economic damages, the partial effect of non-economic damage caps on these age 
cohorts should more extreme values than the coefficients of age cohorts within the typical 
wage-earning age spectrum. As such, I expect that age cohorts between the ages of 
roughly 25 and 65 should not see very significant changes to their payouts or access to 
the justice system when non-economic damage caps are instituted in 2003. The functional 
form of this model is as follows: 
 
(Eq 5.)       𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑚(𝜌𝑖𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽𝑛(𝜌𝑖𝑘𝑡 ×  𝛿𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝛿𝑖𝑡) +  𝜃𝑖 +  𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡 
 
where all variables have the same definition except for 𝜌𝑖𝑘𝑡, which now is a vector of 
nine age bins with coefficient 𝛽𝑚 for the non-interaction term and 𝛽𝑛 for the interaction 
term.28 This is where I further utilize the synthetic panel that I discussed in Section 5, as I 
am following age cohorts throughout time. Each age bin spans 10 years with two 
exceptions; the Young variable only measures density of people younger than 5 years old 
and the Elderly3 variable measures the proportion of the population over 85 years old.  
Table 6, shown in Appendix C, displays the four basic models for my four 
dependent variables while omitting the proportion of the population over 65 and instead 
including the nine of the age bin variables. Some crucial takeaways from this robustness 
test are that no terms predicting indemnity payout are significant for a single age bracket 
or age bracket interacted with the non-economic damage period. In terms of settlement, 
though, the interaction terms of non-economic damage with elderly1 and elderly2both 
28 I only include nine age bin references because the sum of all of these terms equals 1. Including all of 
these terms would lead to collinearity issues. I excluded the variable “young”, so all terms are assuming 
that a particular age bin increases by 1 percentage point and the proportion of those aged 0-5 decreases by 
the same amount. 
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indicate that county and year combinations with more people in these two age bins are 
more likely to settle by 10 percentage points and 8.5 percentage points, respectively. As 
opposed to my model discussed in Section 5, and specifically in Table 3, the values in 
Column 2 of Table 6 now indicate that higher proportions of people in two of the three 
elderly age bins show a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of 
settlement when the non-economic damage caps are applied. This seemingly gives strong 
support to my initial hypothesis that areas with higher elderly densities would experience 
higher likelihoods of settlement. Since counties with more elderly claimants likely have a 
lower feasible award at trial or in settlement, they are more likely to settle rather than 
incur unnecessary legal costs. 
 Moving on to the linear probability of filing a case, Column 3 of Table 6 
highlights that the proportion of people in a county and year combination aged 65-75 has 
a statistically negative impact on the probability of filing a case. In line with the 
takeaways from Table 3, this coefficient indicates a 1 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of the population results in a roughly 7 percentage point decline in the 
likelihood of filing a claim. Interestingly, though, the general term elderly1 is positive 
and significant at the 5% level, implying that the non-economic damage cap lowers the 
probability for an age cohort that is usually more likely to file claims. The other two 
elderly age cohorts show no significant coefficients. Finally, in regards to the probability 
of dropping a claim, both elderly1 and elderly2 indicate that counties and years with 
more people in these age cohorts are more likely to drop claims. Shockingly, however, 
the interaction between the non-economic damage cap dummy and elderly1 shows a 
strongly negative impact on the probability of dropping a case, while the interaction 
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between the non-economic damage cap dummy and elderly2 has a negative and 
insignificant coefficient. This seemingly states that the partial effect of the non-economic 
damage cap on the proportion of the population between 65 and 75 decreased the 
likelihood they dropped a claim. This goes against my hypothesis, and may signify that 
only serious non-economic damage caps entice only very serious claimants to even enter 
the legal system, so counties with higher densities of people between 65 and 75 won’t file 
a case unless they have an intention of seeing the case be resolved. 
 Although most of the interaction terms between non-economic damage caps and 
individual age bins returned insignificant results, there is still value to comparing the sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients of these terms. As such, Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, 
and Figure 8, which are found in Appendix D, visually show the coefficients of the 
interaction term of non-economic damage caps and each age bin for the natural log of 
total paid indemnity, probability of settling, probability of filing, and probability of 
dropping, respectively. Reiterating analysis from above, because the age bin densities 
sum to one I make the assumption that any changes in one age bin come at the expense of 
the youngest age bin.29 Based on my discussion of settlement theory and the incentives 
entering of the medical malpractice liability system when non-economic damages are 
imposed, I expect that coefficients should be more extreme for young, non-working age 
bins and elderly age bins. This would signify that, although the regression results 
displayed insignificance, that non-economic damage caps appear to be behaving as 
expected. 
29 Or, more appropriately, sum to 100 because I multiplied the age bin density by 100 to more easily 
interpret the regression coefficients. 
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 Figure 5 displays fairly erratic results, as the coefficient measuring the partial 
effect on the size of indemnity payment does not show a noticeable pattern in either the 
size or magnitude. In fact, within the three elderly age bins alone there is a noticeable 
difference in the sign of the coefficients. On the younger end of the spectrum, it does not 
appear that density of these age bins have coefficients more extreme than standard 
working age adult bins, young adult through old adult. As such, Figure 5 does not display 
the expected coefficient trend, which bolsters my findings that the indemnity payment is 
not significantly impacted by either the elderly density or specific age bin densities. 
 Figure 6, contrarily, displays slightly be encouraging results than those of Figure 
5. While the coefficient for the adult age bin is larger than any other coefficient, the three 
younger age bin density coefficients, and even the three elderly age bins, appear to 
weakly display more extreme partial effects on the size of settlement. Although I would 
expect that the probability of settlement was closer to zero for typical working age bins 
because most of their damage payments could be classified as economic damages, the 
fact that all age bin coefficients are positive indicates that non-economic damage caps 
seem to cause all age bins to increase the odds of settlement. 
 The visual display of coefficients in Figure 7 shows some encouraging, as well as 
some puzzling, results. The three youngest age bin densities seem to generally show a 
substantial negative partial effect on the likelihood of filing a claim. In the middle age 
bins of working-age individuals, two of the three coefficients hover close to zero as I 
would expect. The coefficient for mid adults between 45 and 55, though, displays an 
extreme partial effect. Furthermore, two of the three elderly age bin densities display 
extreme results as expected, but the elderly2 age bin shows has a coefficient very close to 
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zero. In general, though, Figure 7 seems to indicate that the three younger and the three 
elderly age bin densities seem to have a more substantial effect on the probability of 
filing a claim. 
 Similar to the visual findings in Figure 6, Figure 8 displays that with the 
imposition of non-economic damage caps all age bins are less likely to drop a case, 
although Table 6 does display that some of these coefficients are insignificant. The 
general trend, though, indicates that filing is universally lower once non-economic 
damage caps are imposed. Additionally, it appears that the three middle age bin densities, 
which are likely to be predominantly employed individuals, generally have the least 
extreme coefficients on the probability of dropping a case. These coefficient results meet 
my expectations, and seem to imply that, although I initially expected dropped cases to 
increase due to non-economic damage caps, age bin densities of typically employed 
individuals respond less to non-economic damage caps. Interestingly, the difference 
between the lowest coefficient and the largest coefficient on the probability of dropping 
represents roughly 6 percentage point difference in the chance of dropping a case.  
 The second part of my robustness test involves re-running the complex model 
with my age cohort proportions rather than my individual variable, Over 65, measuring 
the elderly density. Table 7, also located in Appendix C, displays the new regression 
results. Table 7 illustrates a few interesting changes from my initial basic model. Column 
1 shows that the coefficient for elderly2 is now positive and significant; meaning that 
when adding additional control variables, a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of people aged 75 to 85 expects to raise the total indemnity payment by a staggering 
23.7%. Furthermore, unlike the results from Table 2, the no paycheck ratio now has a 
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slightly positive and significant effect on the total indemnity paid out in settled cases. 
This may be a result of cases occurring before 2003, which do not apply under the non-
economic damage cap, having large payouts at trial due to fewer restrictions on the 
damages. 
 Some of the most valuable results from this robustness test are found in Column 
2. In this regression on the probability of settling, we see that the elderly1 and elderly2 
coefficients are negative, implying these parties are less likely to settle claims. When 
elderly1 and elderly2 are interacted with the non-economic damage cap dummy, though, 
we see that these coefficients are very significantly positive, implying that the damage 
cap promotes counties and years with many elderly people to settle cases more despite 
their general propensity to be less likely to settle. This stands in fairly stark contrast to the 
findings in Table 3, and is much more in line with my initial hypothesis that higher 
proportions of elderly people would result in many more settlements, and it corresponds 
fairly well to the findings in Table 6. Additionally, the county and year level still retains a 
significantly negative impact on the likelihood of settlement. The results of Column 3 
show very little, as only one age bin has a statistically significant partial effect, and the no 
paycheck ratio has a positive effect on the probability of filing a case, which is consistent 
with the results discussed in Table 4. Finally, Column 4 displays one very intriguing 
result; the elderly2 variable30 is, at the 1% significance level, more likely to drop cases. 
When interacted with the non-economic damage dummy, however, there is no discernible 
effect. Thus, my robustness tests again provide little insight onto the probability of 
dropping a case, which leads me to believe that the decision to drop a case is likely 
30 But, coincidentally, not the elderly1 or elderly3 variable. 
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independent of the elderly density in a given county. To further bolster this independence 
theory for dropping a case, the interaction between the no paycheck ratio and non-
economic damage cap shows a significant negative relationship, which again goes against 
my general intuition. 
 My final robustness test seeks to mimic the Texas Closed Claims Database model 
by only examining claims with an inflation adjusted indemnity payment over $25 
thousand. Considering that both the basic and complex models of my initial model and 
my robustness age bin models have shown that the density of elderly people in a given 
county insignificantly effects indemnity payments, I restrict my sample similarly to the 
Texas studies to examine if small indemnity payment claims are skewing my results. 
Table 8 displays the new output for the basic and complex model regression on the 
natural log of total paid indemnity. Roughly 4,000 observations have been dropped, but 
the coefficients on both the elderly density and the elderly density interaction term 
remain insignificant, further bolstering the idea that cases filed in counties with higher 
elderly densities do not statistically impact insurance indemnity payments. And, by 
approximation, non-economic damage caps do not appear to negatively impact elderly 
claimants’ payments in settled medical malpractice cases. However, the interaction term 
of non-economic damage caps and per capita income is now significant and negative in 
Column 3 and Column 4, implying that indemnity payments declined in high income 
areas due to the imposition of non-economic damage caps. A final interesting aspect of 
Table 8 is that all coefficients for being a male are statistically significant, and all 
columns of Table 8 seem to display that men typically have 5% to 6% higher indemnity 
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payouts in settled cases. This strengthens the argument Finley (2004) who theorized that 
non-economic damage caps discriminated against women more than men. 
Merging the results of my model with the findings of my robustness testing, the 
only major additional evidence I find of non-economic damage caps discriminating 
against the elderly is that the breakdown of my age data into cohorts showed a very 
significant positive effect on the likelihood of settlement. Overall then, I only find 
moderate evidence to support my hypothesis that non-economic damage caps would 
negatively impact the elderly’s payout in settled claims and provide disincentive to enter 
the medical malpractice claim legal process.  
 
5.4: Regression Limitations 
 I have already discussed the limitations of my data sources in Section 4.3, but my 
regression analysis also leads me to acknowledge some limitations to my findings. 
Firstly, since I do not have specific age data, the interpretation of my regressions relies 
heavily on the existing demographics of the individual counties in Florida. I cannot make 
accurate predictions for individual claimants, so my interpretations are less personal and 
more oriented towards age cohorts. The fact that my interpretations are focused on age 
cohorts rather than individuals naturally limits my study to a broader view of the effect of 
non-economic damage caps. Furthermore, I only acknowledged a handful of control 
variables throughout my regressions. Other control variables, such as the type of 
operation conducted where the malpractice occurred, the specialty of the physician, and 
many other variables that were not attainable could be important in more finely 
investigating how elderly populations are impacted by non-economic damage caps. And, 
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finally, the elderly population of Florida may not be truly indicative of the elderly across 
the United States. Many elderly people move to Florida because they have the necessary 
wealth to live a comfortable life in Florida, which means that a higher percentage of 
elderly individuals may be well off enough that pursuing a medical malpractice liability 
case is not as much of a burden as in other states. Additionally, physicians in Florida are 
likely attuned to the fact that elderly people flock to Florida, and could be better suited to 
provide services to the elderly. 
 
6: Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of Florida’s non-economic 
damage caps on the elderly population using the publicly available Florida Closed Claims 
Database. While various sources of scholarly writing indicate that non-economic 
damages lower payout per claim and commonly result in fewer claims being filed, I 
wanted to see how the elderly in particular were affected by this particular damage cap.  
Due to several data limitations, but most notably the absence of medical malpractice 
claimant age, I used the portion of elderly citizens in the particular county and the 
particular year of a claim filing as an approximation for the elderly population. This is 
commonly called a synthetic panel.  
While I theorized that county and year combinations with higher elderly densities 
would see lower payouts in settled cases, higher probability of settlement, lower 
probability of dropping a claim, and a higher probability of dropping a case, I found only 
weak evidence for my beliefs. Surprisingly, my basic model, my more heavily controlled 
model, and my robustness tests indicated that a higher elderly density during times with 
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non-economic damage caps had no significant effect on indemnity payments or the 
probability of filing a case. Furthermore, my results indicated that some portions of the 
elderly community, notably those between 65 and 85, were much more likely to settle 
after the imposition of non-economic damage caps. My robustness test model indicated 
that a one percentage point increase in the elderly density, between 65 and 85 years old, 
increased settlement likelihood between 8 percentage points and 12 percentage points. 
Higher elderly density during the period 2004-2009 also signified a lower likelihood, 
albeit a small marginal decrease, in the likelihood of filing a claim. Both my basic and 
complex model indicated that a one percentage point increase in the elderly proportion 
for a given county and year decreased the likelihood of the elderly filing a claim by 
between .5 percentage points and .8 percentage points. Finally, my analysis displayed that 
neither non-economic damages nor higher elderly proportions impacted the likelihood of 
a claimant to drop his or her claim. As such, I consider my study as finding mildly 
conclusive results, especially with regard to the probability of filing or settling a claim. 
The rather inconclusive results from my study make it difficult for me to assess 
whether or not non-economic damage caps discriminate against the elderly. Considering 
the limitations of my data source, though, the fact that I still identify areas with higher 
elderly densities as being less likely to file claims and more likely to settle highlights that 
non-economic damage caps appear to have a more substantial effect on limiting the 
elderly’s access to the legal system rather than discriminating against in the form of 
indemnity payments them once they enter the system. A natural extension of this theory 
is to investigate the quality of claims that are now entering the tort system, and to 
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likewise look into an incentive program or piece of legislation that propels elderly 
claimants into the medical malpractice legal system rather than avoiding the system. 
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Appendix A: Relevant History of Non-Economic Damage Caps in Florida31 
 
Year Description of Reform 
1986 Non-Economic Damage Caps capped at $450 thousand per plaintiff. 
Overturned in 1987 by the Florida Supreme Court. 
1988 Limited non-economic damage caps in arbitration ($250 thousand) and cases 
where the plaintiff rejects arbitration ($350 thousand). Still in effect to date. 
2003 Imposed non-economic damage caps against emergency-room practitioners 
($150 thousand per claimant), emergency room facilities ($750 thousand per 
claimant), non-practitioners ($750 thousand per claimant), and practitioners 
($500 thousand per claimant). In especially bad occurrences, though, the 
practitioner limit could be bumped up to $1 million per claimant (such as 
wrongful death), and emergency-room practitioner limit could be bumped to 
$300 thousand. This set of non-economic damage caps was repealed in 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 I Referenced the American Tort Reform Association site on Noneconomic Damages Reform for the 
description of these relevant reforms. 
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Appendix B: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description 
Nonecon 
(Non-Economic 
Damage Cap)  
Equals 1 when the injury date is between 2004 and 2009. Equals 0 
in year injury 1999-2003 when Florida did not have non-economic 
damage caps. Notably, any variables with the subscript Nonecon * 
“variablename”, is the interaction of that variable with the Non-
Economic Damage Cap dummy. 
County Denotes the county that the physician (insured party) is from. 65 
counties are represented in the dataset. 
Total Paid 
Indemnity 
Amount the insurance company pays to the plaintiff either by trial 
or by settlement. 
Ln Total Paid 
Indemnity Adj 
Natural Log of Total Paid Indemnity, adjusted for inflation with 
1999 as the base year. 
Year Year in which a claim was disposed against the insured physician 
or medical institution. Used to control for potential time fixed 
effects in medical malpractice cases. 
Year Injury Year in which the actual malpractice occurred. Injuries occurring 
before 2003 are not applicable under non-economic damage cap. 
If injury occurred between 2004 and 2009 then non-economic 
damage cap applies. 
Settle Equals 1 if the two parties settle before a jury verdict and the 
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payment to plaintiff is greater than zero. Equals 0 if the case 
reaches a jury verdict or there is no payment at settlement. 
Drop Equals 1 if case is dropped or case is settled with no insurance 
indemnity payment to the plaintiff. 
Trial Equals 1 if there are court proceedings or a summary judgment for 
the plaintiff. Equals 0 otherwise. Measures the number of cases 
that actually proceed to trial to be heard by a judge or jury. 
File Equals 1 if a claimant has filed a medical malpractice claim and 
there is no suit date. Equals if 0 if a lawsuit date is reported. Filing 
a claim is a costly step in the litigation process, and essentially 
measures if a plaintiff can get his/her lawyer to proceed further 
than simply calling the insurer to report alleged malpractice. 
Male Equals 1 if the injured party (plaintiff) is a male. Equals 0 if 
female. Used to control for discrepancies between male and 
female claimants. 
Severity Code Equals a value within the range 1 to 9, where lower values are less 
severe malpractice injures. For example, a severity code of 1 
denotes “Emotional Only” damage. A severity code of 9 denotes 
“Permanent, Death”. Used to control for disparities in indemnity 
payouts and probability of entering the tort system based on how 
serious the injury is in a medical malpractice case. 
Per Capita Income Per capita income in the county and year where the insured 
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Adj. operates. Per capita income is inflation adjusted with 1999 as the 
base year. Calculated at a county-year level. 
Ln Per Capita 
Income Adj 
Natural log of per capita income adjusted for inflation with 1999 
as base year. Calculated at the county-year level. Used as an 
approximation for individual claimant’s income. 
No Paycheck Equals the number of individuals not in the civilian labor force 
plus the unemployed members of the civilian labor force, divided 
by the total population. Calculated at the county-year level. Used 
as an approximation for the likelihood that a claimant does not 
have an income stream from an employer. 
Young Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals under the age of 5, multiplied by 100. 
Kid Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 5 and 14, multiplied by 100. 
Student Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 15 and 24, multiplied by 100. 
Young Adult Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 25 and 34, multiplied by 100. 
Adult Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 35 and 44, multiplied by 100. 
Mid Adult Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 45 and 54, multiplied by 100. 
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Old Adult Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 55 and 64, multiplied by 100. 
Elderly1 Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 65 and 74, multiplied by 100. 
Elderly2 Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals between the ages of 75 and 84, multiplied by 100. 
Elderly3 Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, of 
individuals over the age of 85, multiplied by 100. 
Over_65 Equals the percentage of a county’s population, in a given year, 
over the age of 65, multiplied by 100. Also referred to as “Elderly 
density” throughout the paper. Used as an approximation for the 
likelihood that a particular claimant is elderly in a given county 
and year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62  
Appendix C: Summary Statistics Regression Tables 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Mean - Total  
(24,883 obs.) 
Mean: Pre-Reform  
(16,530 obs.) 
Mean: Post-Reform  
(8,353 obs.) 
 
  
  Settle 0.567 0.590 0.522*** 
File 0.422 0.324 0.615*** 
Drop 0.226 0.174 0.329*** 
Trial 0.156 0.187 0.095*** 
Nonecon 0.336 0.000 1.000 
Male 0.475 0.482 0.461*** 
 
  
  Severity Code 5.655 5.818 5.332*** 
Per Capita Income adj 32349.490 32781.730 31494.120*** 
No Paycheck 53.232 0.531 0.535*** 
 
  
  Over 65 17.051 17.035 17.085 
Young 6.227 6.200 6.283*** 
Kid 12.204 12.337 11.941*** 
Student 12.720 12.671 12.818*** 
Young Adult 12.585 12.587 12.581 
Adult 14.240 14.532 13.661*** 
Mid Adult 13.926 13.805 14.165*** 
Old Adult 11.046 10.834 11.467*** 
Elderly1 8.093 8.101 8.076 
Elderly2 6.390 6.460 6.25*** 
Elderly3 2.569 2.473 2.758*** 
 
  
  
 
  
  Total Paid Indemnity adj $243764.6 $263055.2 $200637.5*** 
N (Indemnity 
Payments) 32 14101 9743 4358 
 
  
  
 
*** = 1% ** = 5% * = 10% 
 
32 Appendix B explained that indemnity payments are defined as payments made by insurance companies 
in settled cases, and that a case is settled if the plaintiff payout is greater than zero. In some cases, 
indemnity payments were 0 and other compensatory payments were made to the defendant, so these cases 
were not included in the summary statistics or regression of Total Paid Indemnity. This explains why the 
number of cases with indemnity payments is not the same as the number of settled cases. 
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Table 2 – OLS Regression on Natural Log Total Indemnity Payment 
  Ln Total Paid Indemnity adj 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Over 65 -0.0000723 
  
-0.0139** 
 
(-0.01) 
  
(-2.67) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Over 65 -0.00263 
  
0.00328 
 
(-0.49) 
  
(0.38) 
 
  
   No Paycheck   -0.000421 
 
0.0203 
 
  (-0.04) 
 
(1.74) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck   0.000455 
 
-0.00858 
 
  (0.06) 
 
(-0.86) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj   
 
0.391** 0.622*** 
 
  
 
(3.34) (6.08) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Ln  Per Capita Income adj   
 
-0.296 -0.369 
 
  
 
(-1.31) (-1.52) 
 
  
   Nonecon -0.0779 -0.146 2.941 4.094 
 
(-0.80) (-0.38) (1.25) (1.60) 
 
  
   Male 0.0111 0.0108 0.00920 0.00843 
 
(0.40) (0.37) (0.35) (0.31) 
 
  
   Constant 8.654*** 8.675*** 4.612*** 1.421 
 
(42.06) (15.22) (3.73) (0.93) 
 
  
   N 14101 14101 14101 14101 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 3 – OLS Linear Probability Model of Likelihood of Settlement 
  Settle 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Over 65 -0.00339* 
  
-0.00469* 
 
(-2.03) 
  
(-2.04) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Over 65 0.00282 
  
0.00114 
 
(1.48) 
  
(0.44) 
 
  
   No Paycheck   -0.000548 
 
0.00344 
 
  (-0.38) 
 
(1.19) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck   0.00283 
 
0.00200 
 
  (1.68) 
 
(0.61) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj   
 
-0.0727 -0.0135 
 
  
 
(-1.19) (-0.22) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Ln  Per Capita Income adj   
 
0.0223 0.0242 
 
  
 
(0.30) (0.26) 
 
  
   Nonecon -0.0468 -0.149 -0.232 -0.376 
 
(-1.32) (-1.61) (-0.30) (-0.36) 
 
  
   Male -0.0373*** -0.0385*** -0.0378*** -0.0372*** 
 
(-4.30) (-4.14) (-4.21) (-4.30) 
 
  
   Constant 0.838*** 0.805*** 1.527* 0.821 
 
(22.45) (9.10) (2.40) (1.12) 
 
  
   N 24883 24883 24883 24883 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 4 – OLS Linear Probability of the Likelihood of Filing a Claim 
  File 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Over 65 0.00132 
  
0.000762 
 
(1.15) 
  
(0.46) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Over 65 -0.00544** 
  
-0.00830* 
 
(-3.34) 
  
(-2.30) 
 
  
   No Paycheck   0.00395*** 
 
0.00263 
 
  (3.59) 
 
(1.43) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck   -0.00529** 
 
0.00291 
 
  (-2.95) 
 
(0.77) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj   
 
-0.0621 -0.0541 
 
  
 
(-1.89) (-1.38) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Ln  Per Capita Income adj   
 
0.0305 0.114* 
 
  
 
(0.65) (2.22) 
 
  
   Nonecon 0.575*** 0.762*** 0.167 -0.708 
 
(16.24) (8.29) (0.34) (-1.11) 
 
  
   Male 0.000627 0.000324 0.00141 0.000922 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.17) (0.11) 
 
  
   Constant 1.003*** 0.820*** 1.670*** 1.433** 
 
(29.87) (12.73) (4.81) (3.17) 
 
  
   N 24883 24883 24883 24883 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 5 – OLS Linear Probability Model of Likelihood of Dropping a Claim 
  Drop 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Over 65 0.000155 
  
-0.0000132 
 
(0.16) 
  
(-0.01) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Over 65 -0.00000742 
  
-0.000323 
 
(-0.00) 
  
(-0.14) 
 
  
   No Paycheck   0.00293** 
 
0.00204 
 
  (2.81) 
 
(0.95) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck   -0.00272 
 
-0.00137 
 
  (-1.60) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj   
 
-0.0805*** -0.0694** 
 
  
 
(-3.79) (-2.69) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Ln  Per Capita Income adj   
 
0.0902 0.0857 
 
  
 
(1.92) (1.83) 
 
  
   Nonecon 0.164*** 0.306** -0.772 -0.648 
 
(4.98) (3.35) (-1.60) (-1.23) 
 
  
   Male 0.00268 0.00235 0.00340 0.00304 
 
(0.35) (0.30) (0.46) (0.41) 
 
  
   Constant 0.166*** 0.0144 1.000*** 0.777* 
 
(6.91) (0.25) (4.58) (2.42) 
 
  
   N 24883 24883 24883 24883 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 6 – Robustness Testing Basic Model with Age Bins 
  Ln Total_Paid_Indemnity_adj Settle File Drop 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Kid -0.0608 -0.0236 0.0338 0.0813** 
 
(-0.42) (-0.58) (1.62) (2.97) 
 
  
   Student 0.0109 -0.0313 0.0306* 0.0613** 
 
(0.11) (-1.09) (2.16) (2.87) 
 
  
   Young Adult 0.0260 -0.0212 0.0464* 0.0669** 
 
(0.20) (-0.60) (2.44) (2.75) 
 
  
   Adult 0.0688 -0.0576 0.0252 0.0669* 
 
(0.72) (-1.68) (1.40) (2.25) 
 
  
   Mid Adult -0.0536 -0.0241 0.0338* 0.0589** 
 
(-0.50) (-0.88) (2.09) (3.26) 
 
  
   Old Adult 0.0609 -0.0369 0.0246 0.0644** 
 
(0.57) (-1.15) (1.43) (2.99) 
 
  
   Elderly1 -0.124 -0.0238 0.0533* 0.0608* 
 
(-1.01) (-0.81) (2.46) (2.52) 
 
  
   Elderly2 0.185 -0.0576 0.0159 0.0741** 
 
(1.47) (-1.51) (0.84) (3.17) 
 
  
   Elderly3 -0.183 0.0384 0.0323 0.0121 
 
(-0.94) (0.93) (1.07) (0.41) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Kid -0.0782 0.0837 -0.0608 -0.0936 
 
(-0.39) (1.50) (-1.36) (-1.72) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Student 0.00860 0.0903* -0.0319 -0.0933* 
 
(0.07) (2.51) (-1.08) (-2.43) 
 
  
   Nonecon * 
Youngadult 0.0688 0.107* -0.0527 -0.113* 
 
(0.45) (2.51) (-1.48) (-2.43) 
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Nonecon * Adult -0.102 0.127*** 0.00672 -0.104** 
 
(-0.70) (3.78) (0.21) (-2.83) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Midadult 0.200 0.0682 -0.0559* -0.0885* 
 
(1.27) (1.91) (-2.39) (-2.14) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Oldadult -0.239 0.0887* -0.0217 -0.0696 
 
(-1.62) (2.30) (-0.60) (-1.78) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly1 0.240 0.100* -0.0697* -0.120** 
 
(1.62) (2.19) (-2.02) (-2.86) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly2 -0.157 0.0850* 0.00510 -0.0657 
 
(-0.96) (2.34) (0.18) (-1.60) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly3 0.126 0.0792 -0.0819 -0.0973 
 
(0.63) (1.31) (-1.52) (-1.96) 
 
  
   Nonecon -0.123 -8.787* 3.969 9.024* 
 
(-0.01) (-2.54) (1.40) (2.41) 
 
  
   Male 0.00801 -0.0379*** 0.000442 0.00344 
 
(0.30) (-4.32) (0.06) (0.45) 
 
  
   Constant 8.282 3.816 -2.109 -5.986** 
 
(0.84) (1.36) (-1.52) (-2.89) 
 
  
   N 14101 24883 24883 24883 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 7 - Robustness Testing Complex Model with Age Bins 
  
Ln 
Total_Paid_Indemnity_adj Settle File Drop 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Kid 0.172 -0.0839* 0.0290 0.0606* 
 
(1.14) (-2.33) (1.03) (2.10) 
 
  
   Student 0.166 -0.0692** 0.0287 0.0505* 
 
(1.59) (-2.75) (1.50) (2.53) 
 
  
   Young Adult 0.221 -0.0679* 0.0441 0.0529* 
 
(1.64) (-2.23) (1.77) (2.31) 
 
  
   Adult 0.165 -0.0843** 0.0231 0.0611* 
 
(1.69) (-2.68) (1.16) (2.32) 
 
  
   Mid Adult 0.130 -0.0518* 0.0386* 0.0560** 
 
(1.25) (-2.60) (2.06) (3.18) 
 
  
   Old Adult 0.182 -0.0712* 0.0213 0.0545** 
 
(1.67) (-2.45) (0.99) (2.85) 
 
  
   Elderly1 0.0936 -0.0831** 0.0471 0.0373 
 
(0.75) (-2.77) (1.62) (1.47) 
 
  
   Elderly2 0.237* -0.0697* 0.0155 0.0749*** 
 
(2.20) (-2.20) (0.91) (3.79) 
 
  
   Elderly3 0.0234 -0.0162 0.0278 -0.0114 
 
(0.14) (-0.40) (0.72) (-0.35) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Kid -0.138 0.108 -0.0537 -0.0523 
 
(-0.60) (1.82) (-0.97) (-0.81) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Student -0.0260 0.109** -0.0258 -0.0695 
 
(-0.16) (2.78) (-0.71) (-1.57) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Youngadult 0.0184 0.127** -0.0470 -0.0823 
 
(0.09) (2.76) (-1.10) (-1.53) 
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Nonecon * Adult -0.112 0.140*** 0.0120 -0.0887* 
 
(-0.65) (3.87) (0.31) (-2.22) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Midadult 0.143 0.0914* -0.0501 -0.0760 
 
(0.77) (2.31) (-1.79) (-1.73) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Oldadult -0.270 0.103** -0.0179 -0.0484 
 
(-1.68) (2.73) (-0.43) (-1.17) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly1 0.193 0.124* -0.0608 -0.0761 
 
(0.98) (2.35) (-1.40) (-1.32) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly2 -0.186 0.0858* 0.00239 -0.0616 
 
(-1.08) (2.45) (0.09) (-1.67) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Elderly3 0.0905 0.106 -0.0718 -0.0562 
 
(0.43) (1.77) (-1.16) (-0.92) 
 
  
   No Paycheck 0.0236* 0.00311 0.00383* 0.00509** 
 
(2.32) (1.10) (2.12) (2.71) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck -0.00610 0.00565 0.00149 -0.00626* 
 
(-0.70) (1.52) (0.40) (-2.10) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj 0.692*** -0.128* 0.00637 -0.0234 
 
(4.82) (-2.33) (0.14) (-0.82) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Per Capita 
Income adj -0.198 0.0845 0.0272 0.0685 
 
(-0.65) (1.01) (0.38) (0.78) 
 
  
   Nonecon 5.985 -11.70** 3.093 6.338 
 
(0.34) (-2.71) (0.76) (1.28) 
 
  
   Male 0.00667 -0.0375*** 0.000519 0.00332 
 
(0.25) (-4.34) (0.06) (0.44) 
 
  
   Constant -15.32 8.656** -2.191 -4.952* 
 
(-1.35) (3.23) (-0.98) (-2.37) 
 
  
   N 14101 24883 24883 24883 
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* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Table 8: OLS Regression on Natural Log Total Indemnity Payment > $25,000 
  Ln Total Paid Indemnity adj 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
   Over 65 -0.00289 
  
-0.00854 
 
(-0.72) 
  
(-1.91) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Over 65 -0.00123 
  
-0.00456 
 
(-0.30) 
  
(-0.74) 
 
  
   No Paycheck   -0.00307 
 
0.00794 
 
  (-0.51) 
 
(1.14) 
 
  
   Nonecon * No Paycheck   0.00871* 
 
0.00933 
 
  (2.22) 
 
(1.34) 
 
  
   Ln Per Capita Income adj   
 
0.143 0.258* 
 
  
 
(1.54) (2.17) 
 
  
   Nonecon * Ln  Per Capita Income adj   
 
-0.329*** -0.242* 
 
  
 
(-3.46) (-2.14) 
 
  
   Nonecon 0.0338 -0.450* 3.413** 2.103 
 
(0.38) (-2.22) (3.44) (1.59) 
 
  
   Male 0.0564*** 0.0552** 0.0543** 0.0558*** 
 
(3.46) (3.30) (3.44) (3.50) 
 
  
   Constant 11.44*** 11.55*** 9.920*** 8.472*** 
 
(46.59) (32.20) (10.07) (5.86) 
 
  
   N 10816 10816 10816 10816 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
   
 
omitted controls : Severity Code and Year 
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Appendix D: Figures 
Figure 1: Average Percent Elderly Population by County (1999-2009)33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 In Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, two counties (Glades and Liberty) were initially omitted because 
there are no malpractice claims from either county in my sample. However, using the raw data I found the 
average elderly percentage, per capita income, and No Paycheck ratio for these two counties to simplify the 
map. 
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Figure 2: Average Adjusted Per Capita Income by county (1999-2009) 
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Figure 3 – Average Percent with No Paycheck by County (1999-2009) 
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Figure 4 –Observed Elderly Claim Percentage vs. County/Year Elderly Proportion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
15
20
25
30
35
A
ge
 a
nd
 C
ou
nt
y 
P
er
ce
nt
 E
ld
er
ly
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent Claimants Elderly in FCCD
         
77  
Figure 5: Age Bin Interaction Coefficients for Natural Log Indemnity Payment 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Age Bin Interaction Coefficients for Probability of Settlement 
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Figure 7: Age Bin Interaction Coefficients for Probability of Filing 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Age Bin Interaction Coefficients for Probability of Dropping 
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